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Abstract	  
There	  were	  several	  new	  policy	  reforms	  and	  discourses	  that	  intersected	  with	  the	  
Canadian	   health	   public	   agenda	   during	   the	   1990s.	   	   Despite	   new	   circumstances	  
and	   widespread	   Pan-­‐Canadian	   pressure	   and	   leadership	   calling	   for	   common	  
health	   reforms,	   these	   transformations	   across	   jurisdictions	   or	   policy	   fields	  were	  
not	   “inevitable”	   as	   often	   forecast	   by	   boosters.	   Our	   objective	   is	   to	   better	  
understand	   the	   role	   of	   local	   contextual	   factors	   (culture,	   institutions,	   and	  
interests)	   and	   how	   these	   have	   influenced	   provincial	   experiences	   with	   policy	  
reforms.	   	   These	   contextual	   factors	   do	  not	   exercise	   similar	   degrees	   of	   influence	  
upon	  policy	  change.	  	  Our	  goal	  is	  to	  explore	  and	  evaluate	  how	  health	  care	  reform	  
evolved	  in	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador	  (NL).	  
Introduction	  
There	  were	  several	  new	  policy	  reforms	  and	  discourses	  that	  intersected	  with	  the	  Canadian	  health	  
public	   agenda	   during	   the	   1990s.	   	   Despite	   new	   circumstances	   and	   widespread	   Pan-­‐Canadian	  
pressure	   and	   leadership	   calling	   for	   common	   health	   reforms,	   these	   transformations	   across	  
jurisdictions	  or	  policy	  fields	  were	  not	  “inevitable”	  as	  often	  forecast	  by	  boosters.	  Our	  objective	  is	  
to	  better	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  local	  contextual	  factors	  (culture,	  institutions,	  and	  interests)	  and	  
how	  these	  have	  influenced	  provincial	  experiences	  with	  policy	  reforms.	  	  These	  contextual	  factors	  
do	   not	   exercise	   similar	   degrees	   of	   influence	   upon	   policy	   change.	   	   Our	   goal	   is	   to	   explore	   and	  
evaluate	  how	  health	  care	  reform	  evolved	  in	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador	  (NL).	   	  Our	  case-­‐study	  
was	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  national,	  cross-­‐provincial	  research	  project	  that	  analyzed	  the	  key	  elements	  of	  
health	  policy	  change,	  or	  lack	  thereof.	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The	   literature	   on	   policy	   innovation	   and	   reform	   suggests	   that	   “policies	   are	   not	   the	   inevitable	  
product	   of	   economic	   or	   social	   conditions.	   	   They	   are	   formulated,	   adopted	   and	   consolidated	  
through	   intellectual	   debate,	   political	   struggle	   and	   administrative	   planning.	   Each	   stage	   of	   the	  
process	   involves	  disputes	  over	  relevant	  problems	  and	  feasible	  solutions	  among	  individuals	  and	  
groups	   mobilized	   to	   shape	   the	   policy	   agenda.”1	   Understanding	   these	   dynamics	   across	  
jurisdictions	  requires	  knowing	  what	  is	  going	  on	  at	  the	  grass	  roots	  level.	  
The	  dynamics	  of	  Canadian	  health	  public	  policy	  change	  involve	  learning	  more	  about	  the	  context	  
and	  interplay	  among	  ideas,	  institutions,	  and	  interests.	  	  The	  key	  to	  our	  case-­‐study	  is	  to	  map	  out	  
the	  contextual	  factors	  that	  explain	  different	  patterns	  of	  state-­‐society	  relations	  and	  health	  policy	  
traditions	  within	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador.	  	  While	  there	  has	  been	  much	  academic	  discussion	  
of	   the	   dynamic	   drivers	   and	   constraints	   that	   have	   shaped	   national	   policy	   innovation	   during	  
periods	   of	   crisis	   and	   protest,	   there	   has	   been	  much	   less	   focus	   on	   examining	   policy	   innovation	  
dynamics	  within	  specific	  jurisdictions	  such	  as	  provinces.	  
What	  sets	  Canada	  apart	  from	  most	  modern-­‐industrial	  countries	  is	  its	  unique	  system	  of	  province-­‐
building	   and	   decentralization.	   Effecting	   universal-­‐national	   policy	   transformation	   has	   always	  
been	  a	  challenge	  in	  Canada,	  and	  this	  helps	  explain	  why	  National	  Policies	  were	  abandoned	  in	  the	  
1980s.2	   	   	   As	   illustrated	   by	   various	   implementation	   challenges	   connected	   with	   H1N1	   flu	  
vaccination,	  it	  is	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  get	  everyone	  singing	  from	  the	  same	  hymn	  book.	  
It	   has	   always	   been	   very	   difficult	   to	   define	   national	   problems	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   highly	  
decentralized	   federal	   system,	   where	   both	   provinces	   and	   health	   professionals	   (public	   and	  
private)	   enjoy	   much	   autonomy	   and	   independence.	   	   To	   be	   sure,	   these	   professional	   interests	  
operate	   either	   as	   agents	   for	   competing	   provincial	   states,	   or	   as	   entrepreneurs	   in	   competitive	  
markets	  or	  multi-­‐level	  systems	  of	  governance.	   	  There	   is	  much	  we	  still	  do	  not	  know	  about	  how	  
contextual	   factors,	   such	   as	   intergovernmental,	   interdepartmental	   and	   inter-­‐professional	  
relations	  shape	  the	  pace	  and	  direction	  of	  technical-­‐political	  reforms.	  	  
In	  the	  past,	  policy	  debates	  have	  tended	  to	  ignore	  the	  narrow	  limits	  for	  reform	  set	  by	  contextual	  
conditions.	   For	   example,	   past	   modernization	   theorists	   (popular	   during	   the	   second	   National	  
Policy),	   argued	   that	   federalism	   had	   become	   obsolete	   in	   an	   era	   of	   central	   planning.	   	   But	   this	  
never	   happened	   in	   Canada	  where	   province-­‐building	   and	   federalism	   thrived.	   For	   example,	   the	  
historical-­‐institutional	   literature	  on	  province-­‐building	  provided	  a	  number	  of	   critical	   insights	  on	  
how	   embedded	   ideas,	   interests,	   and	   institutions	   shaped	   the	   pace	   and	   direction	   of	   technical-­‐
political	  change	  and	  restructuring.	  3	  	  These	  fundamental	  debates	  over	  state-­‐society	  relations	  are	  
critical	  to	  our	  analysis.	  	  	  
We	   do	   not	   assume	   that	   change	   is	   “inevitable”	   and	   our	   intent	   is	   to	   focus	  more	   on	   how	   local	  
contextual	   factors	   have	   either	   facilitated	   or	   constrained	   new	   reforms.	   	   Our	   discussion	   is	  
designed	   to	  place	   reform	   ideas,	   interests,	   and	   institutions	   in	  historical-­‐institutional	   context	  by	  
exploring	  the	  dynamics	  of	  policy	  change.	  
In	  the	  beginning,	  the	  NL	  case-­‐study	  was	  designed	  to	  examine	  policy	  innovation	  across	  different	  
policy	   categories.	   	   It	   was	   part	   of	   a	   larger	   Canadian	   Institute	   for	   Health	   Research	   (CIHR)	  
comparative	  provincial	  studies	  on	  policy	  reform.4	  	  Regionalization	  was	  the	  only	  policy	  reform	  to	  
succeed	  in	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador.	  	  	  	  Emphasis	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  focussed	  on	  understanding	  
the	  critical	  factors	  and	  conditions	  that	  helped	  explain	  why	  regionalization	  emerged	  on	  the	  public	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agenda	   albeit	   within	   a	   narrow	   framework.	   We	   assume	   that	   once	   governance	   structures	   and	  
processes	  exist,	   even	   if	   there	   is	   some	  kind	  of	   crisis	   requiring	  action,	  we	   cannot	  predict	   future	  
patterns	   of	   reform	   without	   carefully	   considering	   the	   internal	   conditions	   and	   institutional	  
configurations	  that	  shape	  the	  way	  different	  societies	  respond	  to	  political	  problems.	  	  We	  will	  also	  
briefly	  consider	  why	  the	  other	  health	  reforms	  were	  never	  embraced	  or	  institutionalized.	  	  
We	   began	   by	   relying	   upon	   pertinent	   documents	   (archives,	   grey	   literature,	   Hansard,	   media	  
reports)	   to	  provide	  a	  map	  or	  outline	  of	  critical	   reform	   issues	   that	  mattered	   in	   the	  1990s.	   	  Key	  
insights	   were	   generated	   from	   data	   obtained	   from	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   and	   telephone	   interviews	  
conducted	   between	   September,	   2004	   and	   March,	   2005.	   	   A	   total	   of	   30	   individuals	   were	  
interviewed	  for	  times	  varying	  from	  40	  to	  110	  minutes	  in	  duration.	  	  The	  individuals	  were	  selected	  
based	  on	   their	   current	   or	   past	   participation	   in	   the	   health	   policy	   community	   in	  Newfoundland	  
and	  Labrador	  since	  1990.	  	  Persons	  are	  currently	  or	  were	  members	  of	  regional	  health	  authorities	  
(RHAs),	   politicians,	   civil	   servants,	  members	   of	   interest	   groups,	   health	   professionals	   and	   union	  
leaders.	  	  Interviews	  were	  recorded	  on	  audio	  tape	  and	  transcribed	  by	  an	  individual	  hired	  for	  that	  
purpose.	   	   Twenty-­‐eight	   interviews	  were	   conducted	   by	   Tomblin	   and	   Braun-­‐Jackson	   completed	  
the	  remainder.	  	  Braun-­‐Jackson	  reviewed	  the	  transcripts	  for	  all	  interviews	  and	  checked	  them	  for	  
accuracy.	  	  All	  participants	  were	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  review	  their	  individual	  transcript	  prior	  
to	  coding	  and	  analysis.	   	  Participants	  were	   free	   to	  participate	  or	  not	  and	  were	  provided	  with	  a	  
description	  of	  any	  possible	  harm	  that	  could	  occur	  if	  they	  participated	  in	  the	  project.	  
Analysis	  was	   carried	   out	   using	  QSR	  N6	   software.	   	   Transcripts	  were	   loaded	   into	   data	   files	   and	  
were	  coded	  based	  on	  a	  template	  supplied	  by	  John	  Lavis,	  head	  of	  the	  Ontario	  research	  team	  for	  
the	   project.	   	  We	  wanted	   to	   know	  more	   about	   the	   constraints	   and	   drivers	   generated	   by	   local	  
conditions,	  including	  competing	  actors,	  structures,	  ideas,	  technical	  knowledge	  and	  capacity	  and	  
how	   these	   determined	   the	   ability	   of	   leaders	   to	   advance	   new	   agendas,	   mobilize	   coalition	  
support,	  and	  embed	  a	  technical-­‐political	  fix	  through	  legislation.	  	  	  
	  Transformation	  and	  Change	  
The	   literature	   in	   political	   science	   offers	   competing	   intellectual	   constructs	   for	   understanding	  
patterns	   of	   policy	   reform.	   	   These	   competing	   state-­‐society	   theories	   offer	   different	   ways	   for	  
analyzing	   and	   capturing	   key	   factors	   that	   influence	   policy	   reforms	   or	   outcomes.	   	   From	   an	  
institutional	  perspective,	  state	  capacity	  and	  autonomy	  matter	  most.	  	  	  The	  clear	  consensus	  from	  
our	  participants	  was	  that	  the	  main	  reason	  regionalization	  was	  pushed	  onto	  the	  public	  agenda	  so	  
fiercely	  had	  much	  to	  do	  with	  the	  institutional	  incentives	  involved,	  and	  opportunities	  available,	  to	  
construct	  provincial	  ideas	  and	  build	  coalition	  support.	  	  	  
Regionalization	   emerged	   in	   response	   to	   the	   fiscal	   imperative	   as	   well	   as	   increasing	   social	  
diversity.	   	   But	  we	  were	   also	   told	   that	   regionalization	  was	   understood	   to	   be	   very	   flexible	   as	   a	  
political	  tool.	   	   It	  had	  also	  been	  employed	  in	  very	  different	  critiques	  over	  time,	  so	  there	  was	  an	  
opportunity	   to	  defend	  core	   traditions.	   	  Regionalization	  as	  a	  concept	  or	   theory	  of	   restructuring	  
has	   emerged	   repeatedly	   in	   NL.	   	   Yet,	   economic,	   health,	   municipal,	   education	   and	   other	   sub-­‐
provincial	  regional	  experiments	  remained	  in	  separate	  orbits	  and	  never	  became	  very	  integrated	  
or	  powerful	  across	  policy	  silos.	  	  This	  undermined	  any	  potential	  threat	  to	  the	  premiers	  from	  the	  
grass	  roots	  level.	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World	  of	  its	  Own:	  Perceptions	  and	  Realities	  Confronted	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   privatization,	  waiting	   list	   reform,	   alternative	   systems	   of	   payment,	   drug	   reform,	  
and	  needs-­‐based	  budgeting,	  there	  were	  simply	  fewer	  political	  incentives	  or	  resources	  to	  anchor	  
competing	   frameworks	   that	  would	  be	  both	  viable	  and	  popular.	   	  NL	   is	   a	  province	   that	  has	  not	  
witnessed	  much	  legislative	  health	  reform	  nor	  does	  it	  have	  strong	  historical	  tradition	  of	  building	  
and	  strengthening	  essential	  modern	  civil	  society	  institutions.5	  
When	  NL	  joined	  Canada	  in	  1949,	  several	  formal	   institutions	  were	  started	  anew	  or	  recreated	  in	  
an	  effort	  to	  quickly	  become	  more	  industrial	  and	  modern.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  municipal	  system	  of	  
government	  was	  not	  well	  advanced,	  and	  provincial	  subsidies	  and	  programs	  helped	  expand	  the	  
program	  thereafter.	  There	  was	  not	  even	  a	  pan-­‐provincial	  highway	  system	  necessary	  to	  create	  a	  
more	   integrated	   provincial	   economy.	   NL,	   in	   1949,	   lacked	   critical	   policy	   capacity,	   market	  
capitalist	   and	   democratic	   traditions.	   	   The	   province	   did	   not	   have	   the	   kind	   of	   civil	   society,	  
organizations,	   networks,	   or	   systems	   of	   integrated	   communication	   normally	   associated	   with	  
transformation	  or	  big	  bang	  change.	  	  	  	  	  
From	  1949	  to	  1972,	  Joey	  Smallwood	  took	  full	  advantage	  of	  these	  historical	  divisions	  to	  impose	  a	  
policy	  of	  modernization	  that	  pitted	  urban	  against	  rural	  communities.	   	  These	  conditions	  helped	  
mobilize	  a	  more	  independent,	  province-­‐centred	  vision	  under	  the	  Progressive	  Conservative	  party	  
that	  was	  led	  first	  by	  Frank	  Moores	  and	  then	  Brian	  Peckford.	  	  	  
For	  much	  of	  its	  history,	  the	  NL	  has	  been	  deeply	  divided	  internally	  (church,	  economy)	  and	  there	  
are	  embedded	  competing	  expectations	  and	  political	  experiences	  that	  have	  made	  it	  very	  difficult	  
to	   renew	   governance	   and	   then	   get	   a	   consensus	   on	   key	   technical-­‐political	   issues.	   	   These	  
embedded	   traditions	   have	   added	  much	   to	   the	   challenge	   of	   building	   trust	   for	   big	   bang	   policy	  
changes.	  	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  it	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  getting	  a	  policy	  consensus	  for	  various	  
health	  reforms	  has	  been	  difficult.	  	  
As	   we	   know	   in	   developing	   countries,	   transformations	   and	   policy	   restructuring	   are	   greatly	  
influenced	  by	  dissimilar	  political	  and	  academic	  resources	  and	  experiences.	  NL	  began	  socially	  and	  
economically	  far	  behind	  other	  provinces	  and	  inherited	  different	  divisions	  and	  historical	  realities.	  	  
There	   was	   not	   even	   a	   degree-­‐granting	   research	   institution	   to	   generate	   political-­‐technical	  
solutions,	   facilitate	   public	   policy	   discussions,	   data	   management,	   consensus,	   integration,	   or	  
knowledge	   transfer	   across	   rural-­‐urban	   communities	   until	   1949.	   	   Nor	   was	   there	   much	  
opportunity	   to	  ensure	  that	   local	  problems	  and	  dissimilar	  contexts	  were	  accurately	   reflected	   in	  
new	   policy,	   concepts,	   frameworks,	   or	   political	   visions	   that	   were	   developed	   and	   imposed	  
externally.	  	  
In	  fact,	  the	  combination	  of	  powerful	  leaders	  and	  sense	  of	  isolation	  have	  reinforced	  much	  focus	  
on	  the	  need	  for	  provincial	  self-­‐reliance	  and	  territorial	  self-­‐determination	  as	  opposed	  to	  adopting	  
common	  approaches	  to	  policy	  reform	  based	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  other	  jurisdictions.	  Several	  of	  
our	  informants	  suggested	  that	  NL	  has	  it	  own	  unique	  brand	  of	  province-­‐building	  and	  suspicion	  of	  
top-­‐down,	  urban-­‐biased,	  universal	  calls	   for	  transformation.	   	  NL	   is	  a	  place	  where	  there	   is	  much	  
public	  cynicism	  of	  outside	  experts	  and	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  for	  bureaucratic	  or	  political	  elites	  to	  launch	  
new	   ideas,	   frame	   questions,	   reduce	   or	   build	   coalition	   support,	   or	   gain	   citizen	   trust.	   	   It	   is	   a	  
political	   game	   that	   is	   highly	   decentralized.	   Rhetoric	   is	   a	   more	   likely	   response	   than	   big	   bang	  
change.	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During	   the	   early	   years	   of	   settlement,	   Protestant	   and	   Catholic	   communities	   operated	   for	   the	  
most	  part	   in	  their	  own	  orbits.6	   	  Only	  with	  the	  final	  collapse	  of	  religious	  control	  over	  education	  
and	   health	   policy	   in	   the	   1990s	   did	   conditions	   and	   public	   pathways	   fully	   emerge.	   These	  
institutional	   aspects	   of	   provincial	   government	   remained	   underdeveloped	   for	   decades.	  
Predictably,	  an	  internal	  dualism	  between	  townies7	  and	  outports	  has	  always	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  
work	   together	   based	   on	   a	   common	   vision	   and	   build	   interactive	   learning	   networks.	   	   In	   such	   a	  
context,	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  picking	  common	  external	  enemies	  designed	  to	  unite	  the	  province	  
has	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  popular	  political	  strategy.	  
Viewed	  historically,	  Confederation	  was	  sold	  as	  a	  way	  to	  break	  the	  power	  of	  the	  merchants	  and	  
other	   elites	   through	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   welfare	   state.	   	   But	   there	   is	   little	   empirical	   evidence	   to	  
suggest	  that	  the	  first	  NL	  government	  was	  strongly	  committed	  to	  policy	  experimentation.	  	  For	  the	  
most	   part,	   debates	   over	   Confederation	   focused	  more	   on	   external	   than	   internal	   forces.	  While	  
Smallwood	  was	  a	  modernization	  booster,	  he	  operated	   in	  a	  period	  when	  he	  received	  generous	  
federal	  transfers	  with	  few	  conditions	  attached.	  	  He	  was	  a	  very	  dominant	  premier	  and	  never	  built	  
a	  very	  sophisticated	  planning	  structure	  -­‐	  certainly	  not	  one	  capable	  of	  promoting	  new	  forms	  of	  
integration,	  contestation,	  and	  interaction.	  	  
In	  the	  early	  1970s,	  such	  a	  personalized,	  populist	  approach	  to	  governance	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  neo-­‐
nationalist	  group	  of	  reformers	  who	  were	  determined	  to	  be	  “masters	  in	  their	  own	  house.”	  It	  was	  
a	  time	  of	  bureaucratic	  expansion,	  and	  Newfoundland’s	  own	  “Quiet	  Revolution.”	  	  But	  because	  of	  
challenges	  associated	  with	   internal	  divisions,	   limited	   resources,	   the	  decline	  of	   the	  cod	   fishery,	  
and	  other	  changes,	  renewing	  governance	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  daunting	  task.	  	  	  
Policy	   collaboration	   and	   networking	   across	   territorial	   lines	   or	   policy	   fields	   has	   remained	  
underdeveloped	  in	  NL.	  	  Agenda	  setting	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  powerful	  premiers.	  The	  
departmentalized	   nature	   of	   provincial	   government	   coupled	   with	   the	   construction	   of	  
unconnected	  economic,	  health,	  education,	  and	  municipal	  regions	  have	  created	  other	  barriers.	  	  	  
In	  our	  study	  of	  change	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  regionalization	  stands	  out.	  	  Viewed	  in	  historical	  context,	  
however,	  the	  regional	  idea	  is	  not	  a	  radical	  notion,	  especially	  when	  you	  consider	  the	  number	  of	  
regional	  experiments	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  municipal,	  education,	  economic	  and	  even	  Atlantic	  
Canadian/Eastern	  Premiers	  regional	   initiatives.	   	  Regional	   integration	  as	  a	  domestic	  reform	  idea	  
has	  emerged	  often	  in	  dissimilar	  multi-­‐level	  NL	  governance	  debates.	  	  While	  the	  regional	  idea	  has	  
proven	  to	  be	  popular	  at	  the	  agenda-­‐setting	  stage,	  from	  a	  governance	  perspective	  at	  least,	  these	  
regional	   silos	   have	   contributed	   little	   to	   the	   goal	   of	   steering	   effectively,	   or	   integrating	  
communities.	  	  At	  the	  Atlantic	  Canada	  regional	  level,	  the	  idea	  has	  been	  more	  controversial.	  	  For	  
example,	   Joey	   Smallwood	   left	   the	   regional	   experiment	   in	   a	   spat	   over	   fiscal	   federalism,	   and	  
Premier	  Peckford	  argued	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  Atlantic	  Canada	  was	  a	  myth	  and	  he	  instructed	  his	  
Deputy	   Ministers	   to	   never	   accept	   the	   idea	   of	   Atlantic	   cooperation.	   8	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	  
regionalization	   within	   NL	   is	   about	   devolving	   power	   and	   respecting	   social	   diversity.	   	   Atlantic	  
Canada	  approaches	   reinforce	  holding	   common	  perspectives	   at	   the	  executive	   level.	   	   These	   are	  
very	  different	  objectives	  and	  work	  at	  cross-­‐purposes.	  	  Only	  in	  the	  case	  of	  regionalization,	  when	  
the	  provincial	  state	  had	  a	  keen	  interest	  in	  defending	  itself	  politically	  from	  federal	  cuts	  was	  there	  
much	  interest	  in	  establishing	  health	  regions	  through	  legislation.	  	  As	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  
the	   provincial	   government	   was	   hoping	   to	   download	   some	   of	   the	   blame	   for	   cutting	   rural	  
hospitals	  and	  delisting	  services.	  	  While	  communities	  got	  more	  power,	  the	  provincial	  government	  
managed	  to	  survive	  the	  “blame	  game.”	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Viewed	  historically,	   	   the	  regional	   idea	  was	  not	  a	  new	  idea	   in	  Canada	  or	  NL.	   	  While	  there	  were	  
attempts	  to	  devolve	  power	  to	  the	  regions,	  it	  also	  helped	  facilitate	  the	  closing	  of	  rural	  buildings	  
and	  services,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  was	  homogenizing,	  yet	  reduced	  political	  blame.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
the	   regional	   strategy	   also	   helped	   consolidate	   power	   in	   mega-­‐regions	   and	   service-­‐based	  
economies	   that	   were	   being	   pushed	   by	   Industry	   Canada	   and	   economic	   development	  
departments	  at	  the	  provincial	  level.	  	  	  
For	  example,	   the	  Eastern	  Regional	  Health	  Authority	  had	  a	  budget	  of	  nearly	  $1	  billion	  and	  has	  
always	  employed	  more	  people	   than	   the	  offshore	  oil	  and	  gas	  sectors	  ever	  did.	   	  This	  pattern	  of	  
consolidation	   of	   services	   has	   also	   appeared	   repeatedly	   in	   Gander,	   Corner	   Brook	   and	   other	  
regional	   centers.	   Despite	   these	   new	   realities,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   regional	   vision	   has	   remained	  
ambiguous	  and	  slippery	  (with	  limited	  citizen	  engagement)	  has	  added	  much	  to	  its	  political	  appeal	  
and	  sustainability.	  When	   it	  comes	  to	  regional	  planning,	  provincial	  government	  actors	  maintain	  
much	   more	   control	   over	   incremental	   decision-­‐making	   in	   comparison	   to	   launching	   a	   new	  
program	  of	  privatization.	  
For	  the	  most	  part,	  regionalization	  as	  a	  reform	  game	  operated	  with	  a	  different	  set	  of	  conditions,	  
interests,	  expectations,	  and	  opportunities	   for	   the	  provincial	  government	  and	  other	   supporters	  
of	   the	   status	  quo.	   	   It	  was	  by	  no	  means	  a	   radically	  new	   idea	  and	  was	  popular	   in	  most	  political	  
camps.	  	  Viewed	  from	  this	  perspective,	  there	  were	  many	  incentives	  to	  champion	  limited	  regional	  
reforms.	  	  Put	  simply,	  there	  were	  few	  political	  risks	  involved.	  	  	  
	  Big	   bang	   changes	   are	   always	   possible	   in	   times	   of	   crisis,	   but	   this	   requires	   new	   ideas,	   with	  
motivated	   leaders	  capable	  of	  building	  and	  sustaining	  a	  new	  regime.	   	  For	  example,	  the	  medical	  
profession	  has	  operated	  in	  its	  own	  system	  of	  service	  delivery	  and	  these	  partners	  enjoyed	  much	  
independence	  and	  autonomy	  in	  the	  old	  state-­‐society	  system	  of	  interfacing.	  	  The	  same	  could	  be	  
said	   about	   drug	   companies	   and	   other	   private	   sector	   actors.	   	   In	   NL,	   regionalization	   did	   bring	  
about	  change,	  but	  these	  changes	  were	  a	  reflection	  of	  contextual	  factors	  too.	  	  Inevitable	  changes	  
never	   really	   emerged	   and	   the	   autonomy	   and	   power	   of	   old	   regimes	   were	   accommodated.	  	  
Regional	  reforms	  were	  primarily	  a	  product	  of	  the	  fiscal	  crisis,	  but	  they	  also	  demonstrated	  a	  need	  
to	  strike	  a	  balance	  in	  governance	  that	  was	  not	  only	  viable	  but	  created	  an	  alternative	  avenue	  to	  
organize	  public-­‐private	  interactions	  within	  the	  province.	  	  	  
Policy-­‐Political	  Context:	  Historical	  Overview	  
NL	   is	   well	   known	   for	   its	   underdeveloped	   political-­‐policy	   institutions,	   fragmented,	   small	   scale,	  
staple-­‐based	   communities,	   dualistic	   political	   culture/economy,	   island	   traditions	   and	   history	   of	  
external	   dependency	   on	   the	   national	   state.	   “The	   questions	   of	   integration	   and	   whether	   it	   is	  
worth	   sacrificing	   home	   rule	   for	   industrial	   capitalism	   have	   a	   long	   tumultuous	   history	   in	   the	  
province.	  The	  fact	  that	  Newfoundlanders	  have	  been	  divided	  on	  these	  issues,	  since	  they	  rejected	  
the	   1867	   integration	   option	   helps	   us	   to	   understand	   their	   strong	   opinions”9	   against	   externally	  
concocted	  technical	  or	  “mainland”	  political	  frameworks.	  As	  one	  would	  expect,	  this	  has	  made	  it	  
difficult	   to	   get	   a	   consensus	   or	   impose	   universal	   changes.10	   	   Thus,	   since	  most	   empirical	   policy	  
issues	  and	  debates	  have	  traditionally	  focused	  more	  on	  urban	  rather	  than	  rural	  problems,	  from	  a	  
historical	   perspective	   at	   least,	   transformative	   debates	   have	   played	   out	   differently	   in	   rural	   as	  
opposed	  to	  more	  urban	  communities.11	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One	  of	  our	  central	  tasks	  is	  to	  understand	  why	  getting	  a	  broad	  consensus	  on	  health	  care	  reform	  
has	  been	  so	  difficult	  in	  the	  NL	  political	  context.	  	  Regionalization	  was	  the	  only	  area	  where	  reform	  
occurred.	   	   	   However,	   there	  was	   a	   complete	   lack	   of	   reform	   for	  waiting	   list	  management,	   drug	  
reform,	  privatization,	  needs-­‐based	  budgeting,	  and	  alternative	  systems	  of	  payment.	  	  	  
Achieving	  a	  consensus	  is	  never	  easy	  for	  any	  deeply	  divided	  society.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  rural	  areas	  rely	  
more	  on	  international	  doctors	  than	  urban	  centers	  added	  further	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  consensus	  
making	  and	  communication.	   	  A	  number	  of	  our	   informants	   felt	   that	  getting	  a	  consensus	  across	  
communities,	   policy	   fields,	   or	   even	   functionally	   designed	   departments	   was	   never	   easy,	   even	  
when	   there	  were	  powerful	   external	   drivers	   and	  pressure	   for	   change.	   	  On	   the	  other	   hand,	  we	  
were	   told	   that	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   province-­‐centred	   political	   and	   media	   game	   that	   was	  
historically	   built	   and	   sustained	   more	   by	   territorial	   ideas,	   interests,	   and	   institutions	   than	  
functional	  ones,	  it	  was	  only	  logical	  that	  certain	  types	  of	  reforms	  were	  more	  easily	  pushed	  onto	  
the	  agenda.	  	  In	  fact,	  some	  of	  the	  more	  functional	  challenges	  or	  problems	  (such	  as	  needs-­‐based	  
budgeting)	   only	   survived	   because	   they	   became	   connected	   with	   the	   regional	   and	   territorial	  
power-­‐	  sharing	  game.	  	  	  
Historically,	  at	   least	  until	  2003,	  the	  Liberals	  tended	  to	  over-­‐represent	  rural	  communities,	  while	  
the	   Progressive	   Conservatives	   received	   stronger	   political	   support	   in	   urban	   areas.	   	   Smallwood	  
sold	   the	  Canadian	  social	  welfare	  state	  as	  a	  means	   to	  break	   the	  power	  of	  urban	  elites	  and	  put	  
money	  directly	  into	  families	  and	  communities.12	  In	  such	  a	  game,	  it	  has	  been	  politically	  difficult	  to	  
generate	   and	   mobilize	   support	   for	   collaborative,	   integrated	   policy	   innovations	   pushed	   by	  
technocrats.	  	  Regionalization	  was	  the	  only	  idea	  that	  appeared	  politically	  viable.	  	  	  	  	  
NL	   is	   well	   known	   for	   its	   intense	   internal	   cultural,	   institutional,	   bureaucratic	   divisions,	  
decentralization	   and	   incremental	   traditions.	   	   The	   1990s	   was	   a	   period	   of	   intense	   provincial	  
conflict,	   rise	   of	   a	   regionalized	   party	   system,	   New	   Public	   Management	   (NPM),	   and	   various	  
unilateral	   cuts	   in	   federal	   transfers.	   	   Seen	   this	   way,	   there	   were	   good	   reasons	   why	   the	  
abandonment	  of	  national	  policies	  and	  responsibilities	  and	  push	  for	  “big	  bang”	  changes	  created	  
much	   confusion	   and	   controversy	   for	   decision-­‐makers	   and	   other	   interests	   who	   played	   for	  
different	  audiences.	  	  
Our	  informants	  suggested	  that	  people	  in	  NL	  were	  not	  convinced	  that	  “big	  bang”	  policy	  changes	  
(whether	  in	  health	  or	  economic	  development)	  were	  inevitable	  or	  even	  desirable.	  	  There	  was	  also	  
much	  confusion	  and	  ambiguity	  surrounding	  NPM	  initiatives,	  commitment	  to	  weaken	  the	  state,	  
while	  improving	  efficiencies	  and	  strengthening	  market	  capacity.	  	  	  
Our	  data	  show	  there	  were	  different	  perspectives	  on	  potential	  winners	  and	  losers	  from	  big	  bang	  
health	  changes,	  and	  increasing	  the	  power	  of	  technocrats.	  Our	  interviewees	  clearly	  revealed	  that	  
regionalization	   already	   had	   a	   presence	   and	   it	   was	   an	   easy	   fit	   for	   those	   seeking	   new	   popular	  
alternative	   reforms.	   	   The	   other	   reform	   frameworks	   had	   fewer	   drivers	   and	   faced	   more	  
communication	  challenges.	  	  
Only	   in	   the	   case	   of	   regionalization	   were	   there	   sufficient	   technical-­‐political	   incentives,	  
knowledge,	   resources	   and	   interest	   in	   mobilizing	   policy	   change	   across	   rural	   and	   urban	  
communities	   and	   enhancing	   social	   learning.	   	   Only	   with	   regionalization	   was	   there	   sufficient	  
coalition	  support,	  and	  leadership	  essential	  for	  bringing	  rural-­‐urban	  interests	  together.	  	  All	  of	  this	  
Canadian	  Political	  Science	  Review	  3(4)	  December	  2009	  
	  
Renewing	  Health	  Governance	  (15-­‐30)	   	  
	  
22	  
made	  it	  possible	  to	  construct	  common	  agendas,	  and	  find	  ways	  to	  collaborate	  and	  effect	  change	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  better	  reflected	  local	  values	  and	  experiences.	  	  	  	  
Regionalization	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   very	   popular	   notion	   and	   regional	   forms	   of	   community	  
involvement	   and	   governance	   had	   already	   captured	   much	   attention	   in	   past	   debates	   over	  
municipal,	   education,	   and	  economic	  development	   restructuring.	   	   	  Regionalization	  was	   seen	  as	  
being	   very	   much	   connected	   with	   citizen	   and	   community	   forms	   of	   engagement	   and	   power-­‐
sharing.	  	  By	  design,	  regionalization	  was	  not	  perceived	  as	  an	  external	  threat,	  but	  rather	  was	  seen	  
as	  a	  provincial	  compromise	  that	  was	  doable.	  	  The	  provincial	  state	  was	  always,	  according	  to	  the	  
plan,	   to	   be	   in	   charge.	   	   But	   the	   old	   system	   of	   professional	   and	   market	   autonomy	   was	   not	  
attacked	  either.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  regionalization	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  win-­‐win	  rather	  than	  winner	  take	  
all	  proposition.	  	  	  
Reform	  in	  Historical-­‐Institutional	  Context	  
The	  1990s	  were	  not	  good	  times	  for	  NL.	  	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	  cod	  fishery,	  battles	  over	  Meech	  Lake	  
Accord	  and	  changes	  to	  the	  federal	  unemployment	  insurance	  program	  all	  resulted	  in	  a	  constant	  
outpouring	   of	   human	   capital	   from	   rural	   areas	   to	   other	   provinces,	   especially	   Alberta.	  	  	  
Comparable	   to	   much	   of	   Eastern	   Europe	   in	   the	   1990s	   or	   perhaps	   Quebec	   before	   the	   Quiet	  
Revolution,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   constant	   struggle	   in	   NL	   over	   transformation,	   building	   and	  
sustaining	  market,	  state	  and	  other	  policy	  instruments	  considered	  essential	  for	  success	  in	  a	  new	  
regime.	  	  Nor	  has	  it	  been	  easy	  to	  effect	  change	  in	  a	  federal	  and	  party	  context	  that	  facilitates	  the	  
construction	  of	   separate	  worlds,	  where	  premiers	  play	   for	  very	  different	  audiences.	  Even	   in	  NL	  
today,	  Premier	  Danny	  Williams’	  popularity	  comes	  from	  being	  the	  defender	  of	  the	  underdog,	  the	  
average	  citizen	  against	  the	  federal	  government,	  big	  companies,	  and	  external	  experts	  who	  are,	  by	  
definition,	   often	   perceived	   as	   enemies	   and	   exploiters	   of	   the	   province.	   	   Populism	   remains	   a	  
powerful	  cultural	  force	  in	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador	  politics.	  
From	   an	   historical	   path	   dependency	   perspective,	   NL	   did	   not	   really	   benefit	   very	   much	   by	  
institutionalizing	   new	   frameworks	   or	   mental	   maps	   designed	   by	   external	   universal	   thinkers.13	  	  
These	  are	   the	  memories	   that	  were	  handed	  down	   from	  one	  premier	   to	   the	  next	  and	  we	  were	  
told	   by	   our	   informants	   that	   such	   traditions	   in	   the	   game	  worked	   against	   any	   outside	   calls	   for	  
universal-­‐technical	   fixes	   that	   totally	   ignored	   past	   historical	   experiences.	   	   Newfoundland	   and	  
Labrador	   is	   a	   place	   where	   strong	   leadership	   and	   populist	   strategies	   have	   helped	   fill	   the	   gap.	  	  
Simply	  put,	  achieving	  a	  consensus	  across	  the	  rural-­‐urban	  divide	  has	  never	  been	  easily	  resolved	  
or	  debated	  in	  NL.	  When	  compared	  with	  other	  provinces,	  NL	  lacks	  the	  kind	  of	  formal	  structures,	  
knowledge	  networks,	  and	  policy	  brokers	  that	  exist	  in	  other	  jurisdictions.	  	  While	  some	  of	  this	  was	  
being	  addressed	  in	  the	  1990s,	  since	  the	  change	  of	  government	  in	  2003,	  less	  emphasis	  has	  been	  
placed	  on	  developing	  or	  building	  civil	  society	  capacity	  and	  new	  forms	  of	  engagement	  and	  social	  
learning.	  
Regionalism:	  Case-­‐study	  
The	  only	  health	  policy	  field	  where	  formal	  reform	  occurred	  was	  regionalization.	   	  The	  key	  driver	  
for	  big	  bang	  change	  was	  Premier	  Clyde	  Wells’	   response	   to	  a	   fiscal	   crisis	  which	   threatened	   the	  
future	   of	   the	   province.	   Indeed,	   from	   the	   start,	   the	   problem	   of	   fragmentation	   and	   the	   fiscal	  
imperative	   was	   raising	   questions	   about	   the	   sustainability	   of	   the	   entire	   provincial	   health	   care	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system	   and	   province-­‐building	   generally.	   There	   was	   much	   at	   stake	   as	   key	   supporters	   of	   the	  
provincial	   state	   had	   no	   choice	   but	   to	   defend	   and	   promote	   their	   shared	   territorial	   and	  
jurisdictional	   interests	   against	   New	   Public	   Management	   (NPM)	   calls	   for	   reform	   and	  
transformation.	   	   Viewed	   this	   way,	   regionalization	   was	   really	   an	   attempt	   to	   deal	   with	   new	  
circumstances	  based	  on	  the	  needs	  and	  priorities	  of	  NL	  provincial	  state.	   	   It	  was	  the	  only	  reform	  
initiative	  that	  had	  sufficient	  political	  and	  coalition	  support	  to	  be	  viable.	  	  
From	  the	  beginning	  of	  negotiations,	  certain	  powerful	   interests	  were	  well	  protected	   (especially	  
drug	  companies	  and	  doctors	  who	  never	   fell	  under	   the	  regional	  orbit).	   	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  
were	  told	  that	  these	  types	  of	  regional	  reforms	  would	  have	  been	  more	  difficult	  to	  achieve,	  had	  
the	  media	  or	  opposition	  focussed	  more	  on	  the	  power	  of	  the	  market	  or	  private	  practice	  in	  health	  
services.	   	   But	   this	   was	  most	   unlikely	   in	   an	   era	   of	   NPM.	   The	   combination	   of	   drug	   companies,	  
doctors,	   and	   the	   provincial	   state	  working	   together	   in	   a	   powerful	   reform	   coalition	   guaranteed	  
that	   regional	   reforms	  would	  be	   implemented	  and	  accepted.	  The	  pace	  and	  direction	  of	   reform	  
stayed	   under	   provincial	   control	   but	   it	   was	   also	   constructed	   with	   key	   stakeholders,	   and	  
communities	   being	   granted	   much	   autonomy	   and	   independence.	   	   For	   the	   most	   part,	   these	  
regional	   structures	   and	   mechanisms	   have	   not	   encouraged	   much	   civic	   engagement.	   	   And	   as	  
illustrated	   by	   the	   recent	   Cameron	   inquiry	   on	   breast	   cancer	   detection	   that	   was	   appointed	   by	  
Premier	  Williams,	   regional	  health	  authorities	   in	  NL	  have	  not	  been	  very	  transparent	  or	  patient-­‐
centred.	  	  
Our	  informants	  suggested	  several	  factors	  influenced	  the	  push	  for	  regionalization.	  	  First,	  as	  noted	  
above,	   the	  regional	   idea	  was	  very	  popular	   in	  1990s	  and	  evident	   in	  campaigns	   for	   regionalizing	  
education,	   municipal,	   and	   economic	   development	   services.	   	   It	   also	   helped	   that	   during	   the	  
Smallwood	  years	  there	  was	  a	  provincially	  commissioned	  study	  calling	  for	  health	  regions.	  14	  	  
Another	  key	  driver	  for	  regional	  reforms	  was	  the	  fiscal	  crisis	  that	  threatened	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  
existing	   provincial	   ideas,	   institutions,	   and	   powerful	   interests.	   	   Regionalization	   and	   provincial	  
sustainability	  were	  also	  critical	  themes	  and	  our	  informants	  argued	  there	  was	  much	  incentive	  to	  
respond	   and	   find	   new	   province-­‐centred	   solutions	   that	   reflected	   core	   values.	   	   	   The	   Wells	  
government	  established	  a	  Resource	  Committee	  to	  review	  the	  state	  of	  the	  health	  system	  in	  1990.	  	  
Members	   of	   this	   committee	   were	   drawn	   from	   the	   Newfoundland	   and	   Labrador	   Medical	  
Association,	   the	   Newfoundland	   and	   Labrador	   Hospital	   and	   Nursing	   Home	   Association,	   the	  
Association	   of	   Registered	   Nurses	   of	   Newfoundland,	   the	   Faculty	   of	   Medicine	   at	   Memorial	  
University	   and	   the	  provincial	  Department	  of	  Health.	   The	  urge	   to	  embrace	   regionalization	  as	   a	  
panacea	  for	  rocketing	  health	  care	  costs	  was	  driven	  primarily	  by	  fiscal	  concerns	  and	  pressure	  for	  
shared	   knowledge	   and	   finding	   ways	   to	   respect	   community	   diversity	   while	   improving	   health	  
outcomes	  everywhere	  in	  the	  province.15	  	  	  
In	  an	  effort	  to	  gain	  provincial	  control	  over	  the	  reform	  process	  and	  champion	  the	  regional	  cause,	  
Health	  Minister	  Decker	  appointed	  Lucy	  Dobbin	  (a	  former	  CEO	  of	  St.	  Clare’s	  Hospital	  in	  St.	  John’s)	  
to	  chair	  a	  commission	  to	  review	  how	  hospital	  boards	  could	  be	  reorganized.	  	  In	  March,	  1993,	  the	  
Report	  on	  the	  Reduction	  of	  Hospital	  Boards	  was	  released.16	  	  
In	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   regionalization,	   government	   established	   two	   types	   of	   health	   boards:	  	  
institutional	   and	   integrated.	   	   The	   institutional	   boards	   were	   responsible	   for	   the	   delivery	   of	  
medical	  services	  through	  hospitals	  and	  clinics	   in	  each	  region.	   	   Integrated	  boards	  combined	  the	  
functions	  of	   the	   institutional	   boards	  with	   community	   and	   social	   service	  programs	  provided	   to	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the	  population	  within	  the	  region.	  	  Beginning	  in	  1998,	  a	  third	  type	  of	  board	  was	  created.	  	  Health	  
and	  community	  service	  boards	  were	  created	  to	  administer	  health	  prevention,	  promotion,	  child	  
welfare,	  addiction,	  mental	  health	  and	  other	  programs	  within	  the	  province.	  	  The	  adoption	  of	  such	  
boards	  followed	  the	  make	  over	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  into	  a	  new	  Department	  of	  Health	  
and	   Community	   Services.	   	   The	   new	   department	   assumed	   responsibility	   for	   some	   functions	  
previously	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Human	  Resources	  and	  Employment.	  	  	  
When	   regionalization	   was	   embraced	   by	   the	  Wells	   government	   in	   1993,	   the	   primary	   reasons	  
given	  were	  to	  provide	   improved	  continuity	  of	  health	  care	  and	  to	  avoid	  costly	  duplication.	   	  The	  
intent	  was	   to	  build	   regional	   capacity	   in	  a	  way	   that	   struck	  a	  balance	  between	   rural	   equity	  and	  
urban	   efficiency.	   	   The	   main	   driver	   behind	   regionalization	   was	   fiscal;	   that	   is,	   the	   government	  
wanted	  to	  reign	  in	  health	  spending	  without	  disruption	  to	  basic	  service	  delivery	  in	  both	  rural	  and	  
urban	  communities.	  Health	   regions	  helped	  download	  political	   responsibility	  and	  accountability	  
for	  health	  restructuring	  and	  this,	  according	  to	  our	  informants,	  was	  important	  to	  politicians.	  	  
The	   Department	   of	   Health	   and	   Community	   Services	   transferred	   responsibility	   for	   health	   care	  
delivery	  to	  the	  boards	  while	  monopolizing	  policy-­‐making.	  	  Before	  the	  boards	  were	  in	  place,	  the	  
Department	  directly	  managed	  nearly	  twenty	  cottage	  hospitals.	   	  These	  were	  replaced	  or	  closed	  
down	  entirely	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  regionalization.	  	  While	  the	  government	  did	  retain	  some	  degree	  
of	  control	  over	  the	  health	  boards	  with	  respect	  to	  budgets	  and	  appointments,	  the	  boards	  were	  
deemed	  to	  be	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  providing	  services	  to	  patients.	  
The	  most	   recent	   round	  of	   reforms	   connected	   to	   regionalization	   formally	   began	   in	   2003	  when	  
the	  Progressive	  Conservative	  Party	  of	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador,	  led	  by	  Danny	  Williams,	  won	  
the	  provincial	  election.	  	  Williams	  laid	  out	  his	  party’s	  policy	  platform	  in	  the	  “Blue	  Book.”	  	  Many	  of	  
the	  proposals	  were	  targeted	  toward	  reducing	  the	  debt	  and	  deficit	  of	  the	  provincial	  government.	  	  
The	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Community	  Services	  was	  not	  exempt	  from	  the	  desire	  to	  reduce	  
the	  size	  and	  expenditure	  of	  government.	  	  Regional	  boundaries	  and	  structures	  were	  changed	  in	  a	  
bid	   to	   reduce	   the	  number	  of	   health	   regions	   and	   to	   create	  one	   regional	  model.	   	   For	   the	  most	  
part,	  regionalization	  was	  about	  decentralization;	  that	   is,	   it	  never	  threatened	  to	   impose	  a	  more	  
integrated	  vision	  on	  doctors,	  drug	  companies,	  or	  other	  supporters	  of	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  	  
While	   regionalization	  was	  about	   consolidation	  of	  urban	  power	  and	  medical	   specialization,	   the	  
movement	  also	  had	  strong	  appeal	   in	  a	  period	  of	   fiscal	  crisis.	   	  From	  a	  pluralist	  perspective,	   the	  
pace	  and	  direction	  of	  change	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  new	  interplay	  between	  the	  provincial	  state	  and	  
key	  interests	  such	  as	  drug	  companies	  and	  doctors	  who	  helped	  influence	  the	  pace	  and	  direction	  
of	  reform.	  	  While	  regionalization	  resulted	  in	  some	  changes	  in	  management	  and	  rhetoric,	  these	  
were	  hardly	  radical,	  and	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  other	  key	  stakeholders	  (especially	  doctors	  
and	  drug	  companies)	  were	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  unaffected.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Failure	  of	  Other	  Health	  Care	  Reforms	  
According	  to	  information	  gleaned	  from	  informants,	  none	  of	  the	  other	  reform	  issues	  came	  close	  
to	   attracting	   the	   same	   level	   of	   attention,	   resources,	   or	   consensus	   that	   regionalization	  did.	  No	  
other	   movement	   had	   the	   capacity,	   political	   support,	   or	   autonomy	   required	   to	   organize	   and	  
replace	  formal	  ideas,	  institutions,	  and	  interests.	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Remarkably,	  much	  of	  the	  pressure	  for	  change	  in	  the	  other	  policy	  fields	  was	  perceived	  more	  as	  
external,	   technical,	   or	   peripheral	   (a	   mainland	   problem	   at	   best).	   Our	   participants	   argued	   that	  
waiting	  list	  reform,	  for	  example,	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  product	  of	  pressure	  by	  policy	  institutes,	  or	  insular	  
federal-­‐provincial	  meetings	  that	  were	  dominated	  by	  bigger	  provinces	  and	  their	  experts.	  	  	  
Similarly,	   our	   informants	   argued	   that	   other	   calls	   for	   reform	  were	   either	   too	  big	   or	   expensive.	  	  
The	   problem	   of	  maintenance	   and	   recruitment,	   for	   example,	   made	   it	   very	   difficult	   to	   get	   too	  
excited	  about	  new	  technical	  reforms	  that	  were	  unsustainable	  politically	  or	  economically.	  There	  
was	   also	   a	   sense	   that	   only	   regionalization	  made	   sense	   politically	  while	   other	   reforms	   (needs-­‐
based,	   for-­‐profit,	   and	  waiting	   list)	  were	   perceived	   as	   having	   an	   urban	   bias	   and	  would	   end	   up	  
either	  diverting	  resources	  for	  urban-­‐technological	  problems	  or	   ignoring	  rural	  health	  challenges	  
entirely.	   According	   to	   decision-­‐makers,	   these	   reforms	   were	   not	   seen	   as	   solutions	   capable	   of	  
building	  broad	  coalition-­‐support	  in	  the	  way	  that	  regionalization	  did.	  	  
Similarly,	  we	  were	  informed	  that	  support	  for	  privatization	  came	  primarily	  from	  private	  interests	  
who	  operated	   in	  competitive	  markets.	   	  But	  given	   the	  more	  diverse,	  and	  pluralistic	  NL	  political	  
context,	   building	   a	   consensus	   was	   more	   difficult	   and	   these	   reforms	   failed	   to	   gain	   political	  
champions	   for	   the	   cause	   in	   quite	   the	   same	   way	   Clyde	   Wells	   stepped	   forward	   to	   pursue	  
regionalization.	   	   Other	   than	   regionalization,	   there	   emerged	   no	   clear	   consensus	   on	   whether	  
other	  health	  reforms	  were	  sustainable,	  or	  would	  likely	  improve	  patient	  and	  system	  outcomes.	  
The	   fact	   that	   rural	   areas	   were	   dominated	   by	   international,	   salary-­‐based	   doctors,	   while	  
physicians	   in	  urban	  areas	  were	   remunerated	  on	  a	   fee-­‐for	   service	  basis,	   clearly	  made	  getting	  a	  
consensus	  across	  competitive	  political	  parties,	  regions,	  or	  professions	  more	  difficult.	  	  Only	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  regionalization	  (where	  there	  were	  entrenched	  traditions	  of	  territorial	  ideas,	  community	  
interests,	  and	  institutions)	  was	  it	  possible	  to	  build	  broad	  support.	  	  
An	  underlying	  reform	  constraint	  was	  the	  problem	  of	  working	  around	  the	  urban-­‐rural	  divide	  and	  
finding	  an	  appropriate	  balance.	   	  Since	  most	  specialized	  services	  are	  located	  in	  St.	  John’s,	  there	  
are	  problems	  associated	  with	  spending	  money	  there	  and	  building	  knowledge	  and	  service-­‐based	  
economic	   capacity.	   	   Similar	   challenges	   occur	   in	   other	   health	   regions.	   	   As	   suggested	   by	   one	  
informant,	  “I	  know	  there’s	  competition	  here,	  there	  is	  a	  stress,	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  
money	  that	  goes	  into	  St.	  John’s	  and	  the	  amount	  that	  goes	  elsewhere”17.	  	  There	  is	  a	  tradition	  of	  
exploiting	  strong	  executive	  leadership	  (during	  times	  of	  crisis)	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  striking	  a	  more	  
reasonable	  political	  compromise.	  
Summary	  of	  reforms	  in	  other	  health	  policy	  fields	  
Based	   on	   our	   interviews,	   we	   can	   conclude	   that	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   regionalization,	   health	  
reform	  was	  an	  issue	  that	  did	  not	  have	  much	  local	  interest	  or	  support.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  
have	   been	   informal	   reforms	   and	   pilot	   projects	   that	   were	   occasionally	   externally	   funded	   or	  
inspired.	   	   In	   practice,	   there	   has	   never	   been	   a	   provincial	   crisis	   big	   enough	   to	   force	   all	   health	  
reforms	  across	  all	  pathways	  or	   silos.	   	   Informal,	   incremental	   changes	  have	   remained	  a	  popular	  
option	  available	  in	  NL	  and	  a	  convenient	  way	  to	  solve	  problems	  without	  invoking	  rural-­‐urban	  or	  
professional	   divisions.	   	   We	   review	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   failure	   of	   other	   forms	   of	   health	   care	  
reform	  to	  germinate	  in	  NL	  below.	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Wait	  List	  Management	  
Newfoundland	   and	   Labrador	   does	   not	   have	   a	   formal	   system	   for	   wait	   list	   tracking	   and	  
management	  found	  in	  other	  jurisdictions.	  	  There	  has	  never	  been	  an	  attempt	  to	  establish	  or	  erect	  
the	   kind	   of	   province-­‐centred	   formal	   policy	   instruments	   required	   to	   define	   the	   problem	   of	  
waiting	   lists,	   measure	   it,	   produce	   a	   framework	   or	   guide	   to	   frame	   responses,	   or	   measure	  
outcomes.	   Rather,	   the	   provincial	   government	   has	   typically	   relied	   on	   informal	   networks	   of	  
physicians	  and	  surgeons	  to	  manage	  patient	  flows.	  Wait	  list	  management,	  while	  acknowledged	  as	  
a	  significant	  concern,	  has	  not	  seized	  the	  attention	  of	  decision-­‐makers.	  Why	  was	  there	  not	  more	  
pressure	  to	  establish	  a	  formal	  waiting	  list	  system?	  	  Our	  informants	  noted	  that	  (1)	  interest	  in	  the	  
issue	  was	  only	  triggered	  by	  external	  forces	  such	  as	  federal	  government	  reports,	  experimentation	  
in	  other	  provinces	  and	  media	  reports	  on	  citizen	  frustration	  concerning	  medical	  procedures;	  (2)	  
the	   issue	  was	   localized	   to	   St.	   John’s	   only	   and	   (3)	   the	   ad	   hoc	  management	   of	   patient	   lists	   by	  
physicians	  and	   surgeons	   reinforces	   separate	   silos,	   cultures	  and	   interests.	   	  What	  exists	   in	  NL	   is	  
not	   only	   a	   highly	   decentralized,	   diffused,	   territorial	   system	   of	   delivery,	   but	   separate	   silos	   or	  
systems	   for	   managing	   and	   delivering	   cardiac,	   mental	   health,	   long-­‐term	   care,	   and	   other	  
programs.	  	  	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   Newfoundland	   and	   Labrador,	   we	   can	   conclude	   that	   “one	   size	   does	   not	   fit	   all”	  
when	   it	   comes	   to	  managing	  wait	   lists.	   	  With	   its	   small	   population,	   poor	   fiscal	   capacity,	   limited	  
number	  of	  physicians	  and	  specialists	  and	  tertiary	  medical	  care	  confined	  to	  the	  capital	  region,	  it	  
may	  simply	  be	   too	  expensive	   to	  create	  a	   formalized	  waiting	   list	   system.	  Besides,	  NL	   is	  a	  place	  
with	   a	   long	   tradition	   of	   diffusion,	   decentralization,	   and	   community-­‐silo	   based	   approaches	   to	  
problem	   definition	   and	   resolution.	   	   Waiting	   list	   reform	   has	   never	   attracted	   much	   domestic	  
attention	  or	   sense	  of	   crisis	   among	   local	   stakeholders,	   politicians,	   and	  health	   institutions.	   	   The	  
opportunities	  for	  civic	  engagement	  have	  been	  limited	  and	  it	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  is	  very	  complex	  and	  
technical,	   and	  as	   a	   result,	   has	  not	   attracted	  much	  media	   interest.	   	   There	   is	  more	  evidence	  of	  
divergence	   than	   convergence	   in	   this	   area	   of	   health	   restructuring,	   and	   little	   evidence	   that	   it	  
made	  sense	  to	  develop	  one	  model	  for	  waiting	  list	  reform.	  	  Currently	  there	  are	  no	  champions	  of	  
waiting	  list	  reform	  in	  the	  province	  either	  building	  coalition	  or	  public	  support.	  	  	  
For	  Profit	  Delivery	  of	  Medical	  Services	  
The	  issue	  of	  privatizing	  and	  introducing	  for-­‐profit	  medical	  and	  hospital	  services	  in	  NL	  has	  dimly	  
pierced	   the	   policy	   radar.	   	   Since	   the	   1990s,	   no	   government	   has	   passed	   legislation,	   held	   public	  
hearings	   or	   commissioned	   research	   to	   study	   this	   issue	   in	   a	   formal	  manner.	   	   	   Our	   informants	  
noted	   the	  main	   reasons	   for	   this	  were	   (1)	  widespread	  poverty	  and	   regional	  economic	  disparity	  
within	  the	  province;	  (2)	  no	  groups	  acting	  	  as	  policy	  champions;	  (3)	  the	  limited	  policy	  capacity	  of	  
the	  provincial	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Community	  Services	  and	  (4)	  the	  lack	  of	  support	  among	  
physicians	  for	  privatization	  of	  medical	  and	  hospital	  services.	   	  There	  is	  not	  much	  interest	   in	  for-­‐
profit	   delivery	   of	  medical	   services	   for	   two	   reasons.	   	   First,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   sustain	   a	   for-­‐profit	  
health	   care	   system	   given	   the	   small	   population	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   status	   of	   the	   province’s	  
people.	  Regime	  changes	  do	  not	  occur	  when	  there	  is	  not	  an	  alternative	  set	  of	  ideas,	  interests	  and	  
institutions	  capable	  of	  taking	  over	  and	  dealing	  with	  new	  circumstances.	   	  Without	  this	  capacity,	  
there	  would	  be	  little	  reason	  for	  change.	  	  Second,	  discussions	  about	  private,	  for-­‐profit	  medicine	  
in	  the	  province	  raise	  the	  ire	  of	  several	  key	  groups	  of	  opinion	  makers	  including	  physicians,	  health	  
care	   unions,	   nurses,	   academics,	   and	   some	   politicians.	   	   Other	   than	   experiments	   with	   public-­‐
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private	  partnerships	  in	  the	  area	  of	  long-­‐term	  care,	  there	  has	  not	  been	  anything	  approaching	  an	  
Alberta-­‐style	  call	  for	  health	  privatization.	  
Prescription	  Drug	  Reform	  
A	  significant	  factor	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  universal	  prescription	  drug	  program	  in	  NL	  is	  cost.	  	  Currently	  
under	   the	   province’s	   targeted	   drug	   plan,	   approximately	   110,000	   persons	   are	   provided	  
catastrophic	   coverage	   at	   a	   cost	   of	   $114	   million	   (fiscal	   year	   2005).	   	   This	   represents	   twenty	  
percent	   of	   the	   population.	   	   This	   group	   consumes	   approximately	   40	   percent	   of	   all	   the	  
prescription	  drugs	  purchased	  across	  the	  province.	  	  	  
A	  related	  theme	  concerns	  equity	  in	  drug	  coverage	  with	  respect	  to	  new	  therapies.	  	  
In	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador,	  particular	  “champions”	  have	  emerged	  to	  lobby	  government	  to	  
include	  specific	  therapies	  in	  the	  formulary	  for	  individuals	  who	  either	  cannot	  afford	  them	  or	  for	  
those	  persons	  whose	  private	  drug	  plans	  do	  not	  cover	  any	  or	  all	  of	  the	  costs.	  Groups	  such	  as	  the	  
Cancer	  Society	  and	  the	  Arthritis	  Society	  usually	  rely	  on	  the	  mass	  media	  to	  publicize	  cases	  where	  
patients	  are	  needlessly	  suffering	  because	  they	  cannot	  afford	  the	  necessary	  therapy.	   	  The	  kinds	  
of	   policy	   choices	  made	   by	   the	   provincial	   government	  with	   respect	   to	   drug	   reform	   are	   largely	  
focused	   on	   sustaining	   the	   current	   targeted	   program	   rather	   than	   finding	   ways	   to	   renew	  
governance	  and	  build	  new	  networks.	  	  	  
There	  have	  not	  been	  any	   formal	   institutional	  or	   legislative	  acts	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  province’s	  
targeted	  drug	  plan.	   	  Reform,	  when	  it	  has	  occurred,	  has	  been	  incremental,	  reactive	  rather	  than	  
proactive,	   and	   forced	   on	   government	   as	   a	   result	   of	   national	   commissions	   and	   reports	   and	  
internally	   by	   the	  mass	  media	   on	   behalf	   of	   disease-­‐advocacy	   groups.	   	   Lack	   of	   provincial	   fiscal	  
capacity,	  independence	  and	  autonomy	  has	  not	  helped	  push	  drug	  reform	  onto	  the	  public	  agenda,	  
and	  internal	  divisions	  within	  the	  province	  have	  undermined	  any	  chance	  for	  building	  coalition	  or	  
social	  network	  support	  for	  a	  new	  vision	  for	  NL.	  	  	  
Needs-­‐Based	  Budgeting	  
While	  there	  has	  been	  some	  interest	  in	  establishing	  a	  more	  needs-­‐based	  approach	  to	  budgeting	  
in	   NL,	   there	   is	   also	   a	   lack	   of	   political	   will.	   	   Needs-­‐based	   discourses	   and	   frameworks	   offer	   a	  
different	  approach	   for	  balancing	  equity-­‐efficiency	   issues	   than	  market	  models,	  but	   there	   is	   still	  
much	  confusion	  about	  how	  this	  vision	  would	  work	  in	  practice.	  	  Change	  or	  lack	  of	  change	  is	  often	  
a	  product	  of	  crisis	  connected	  with	  new	  circumstances,	  but	  effective	  transformation	  depends	  on	  
leadership	  and	  coalition	  mobilization	  around	  a	  clear	  vision.	  	  Needs-­‐based	  budgeting	  visions	  lack	  
critical	  details.	  
The	   fundamental	   reason	   why	   Newfoundland	   and	   Labrador	   is	   a	   “no	   go”	   with	   respect	   to	  
budgetary	  reform	  in	  health	  care	   is	  because	  elected	  officials	  desire	  a	  degree	  of	  political	  control	  
over	   how	   health	   resources	   are	   distributed.	   	   Decision-­‐makers	   are	   reluctant	   to	  move	   toward	   a	  
system	  that	  allocates	  funds	  based	  on	  a	  flexible,	  even	  ambiguous	  definition	  of	  need.	  	  From	  their	  
perspective,	   since	   they	   do	   not	   have	   much	   control	   over	   drug	   costs,	   maintenance	   and	  
recruitment,	  medical	  ethics,	   research,	   federal	   fiscal	   transfers	  and	  other	   factors	   that	   shape	   the	  
pace	   and	   direction	   of	   health	   restructuring	   and	   agenda-­‐setting,	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   decision-­‐
makers	  would	  be	  reluctant	  to	  cede	  power	  and	  autonomy	  without	  getting	  some	  assurances	  that	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changes	  would	  be	  in	  the	  public	  good.	  	  At	  this	  stage,	  there	  remains	  much	  ambiguity	  about	  how	  
needs	  would	  be	  calculated	  and	  who	  the	  winners	  and	  losers	  would	  be.	  	  	  
Given	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   for	   the	   economy,	   and	   the	   rural-­‐urban	   tensions	   involved,	   it	   is	   not	  
surprising	  that	  getting	  a	  political	  and	  academic	  consensus	  over	  these	  kinds	  of	  reforms	  have	  been	  
difficult.	   In	  many	  parts	  of	   rural	  Newfoundland,	   for	  example,	  ecological	  health	   is	  a	  bigger	  need	  
than	   population	   health.	   	   That	   being	   said	   equalization	   and	   various	   components	   of	   the	  welfare	  
state	  have	  been	  designed	  to	  define	  need	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  territory,	  not	  function.	  	  Since	  more	  poor	  
people	   live	   in	  big	  cities	   than	  poor	  provinces,	   it	   seems	   logical	   that	  choice	  of	  policy	   instruments	  
and	  patterns	  of	  discourse	  do	  influence	  outcomes	  and	  the	  course	  of	  problem	  definition.	  	  Under	  
such	   circumstances,	   certain	   stakeholders	   may	   prefer	   the	   status	   quo	   to	   new	   patterns	   of	  
transformation.	  
Government	   did	   not	   embrace	   a	   population-­‐based	   funding	   model	   mainly	   because	   it	   would	  
remove	  further	  political	  control	  from	  the	  funding	  process;	  government	  lacks	  the	  policy	  capacity	  
to	   move	   forward	   on	   this	   issue;	   this	   particular	   funding	   method	   is	   difficult	   to	   implement;	  
politicians	  are	  motivated	  by	  the	  mobilization	  of	  public	  opinion	  and	  not	  by	  objective	  indicators	  of	  
health	  and	  that	  the	  province’s	  small	  population	  and	  geography	  make	  a	  population-­‐based	  model	  
unfeasible.	  
Alternative	  Physician	  Payment	  	  
The	  model	  for	  primary	  care	  renewal	  in	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador	  evolved	  from	  the	  province’s	  
Strategic	   Health	   Plan	   in	   consultation	   with	   health	   professionals,	   physicians,	   regional	   health	  
boards,	   community	   groups	   and	   government	   officials.	   	   The	   focus	   has	   been	   on	   physician	  
recruitment	  and	  retention	  especially	  in	  rural	  areas	  rather	  than	  on	  models	  of	  payment.	  	  	  In	  fact,	  
Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador	  has	   the	  highest	   rate	  of	   salaried	  doctors	   in	  Canada.	   	   In	  our	   study,	  
payment	  models	  and	  primary	  health	  care	  intersected	  around	  2000	  due	  to	  government’s	  interest	  
in	  keeping	  the	  health	  care	  system	  sustainable.	  
We	  argue	  that	  the	  chief	  barrier	  to	  primary	  health	  care	  reform	  in	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador	  is	  
an	  acceptable	  payment	  model	   for	  physician	  buy-­‐in	  and	  support.	   	  Other	  barriers	   include	  health	  
human	   resource	   issues	   (scopes	   of	   practice,	   opportunities	   for	   clinical	   and	   educational	   training,	  
payment	   for	   emergency	   room	   services),	   lack	   of	   support	   in	   rural	   areas	   and	   the	   inability	   of	  
government	  to	  provide	  adequate	  financial	  resources	  for	  project	  implementation.	  
The	  focus	  on	  physician	  recruitment	  and	  retention	  places	  government	  in	  a	  subordinate	  position	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   doctors	   because	   of	   labour	   mobility.	   	   If	   government	   fails	   to	   provide	   suitable	  
compensation,	   incentives	  to	  practice	   in	  rural	  areas,	  opportunities	   to	  update	  skills	  and	  the	   like,	  
then	  physicians	  will	  relocate	  to	  jurisdictions	  where	  they	  will	  be	  better	  compensated.	  	  Herein	  lays	  
the	   power	   of	   the	   doctors	   and	   why	   the	   NL	   government	   finds	   itself	   constrained	   from	   doing	  
anything	  about	  it.	  	  Whether	  in	  alternative	  systems	  of	  payment	  or	  regionalization,	  the	  power	  of	  
the	  physician	  is	  an	  important	  constraint	  on	  public	  policy	  choices	  in	  NL.	  	  
Conclusion	  
With	   the	   exception	   of	   regionalization,	   NL	   is	   a	   laggard	   when	   it	   came	   to	   formal	   health	   policy	  
change.	  It	  is	  a	  place	  known	  for	  too	  much	  geography	  and	  internal	  divisions.	  	  NL	  is	  also	  known	  for	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its	   territorial	   competitiveness	   and	   capacity	   for	   seeing	   and	   understanding	   regional	   issues	   and	  
conflicts.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   regionalization,	   a	   common	   sense	   of	   a	   province-­‐centred	   crisis	   and	  
territorially	   based	   system	  of	   organization	   helped	   push	   the	   issue	   onto	   the	   public	   agenda.	   	   Put	  
simply,	   there	  was	  much	   territorial	   leadership	   and	   biases	   for	   building	   regional	   capacity	   across	  
professional/community	  partnerships	  and	  networks.	  	  	  But	  these	  were	  carefully	  designed	  to	  not	  
challenge	  the	  power	  or	  autonomy	  of	  doctors	  and	  drug	  interests.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  bio-­‐medical	  and	  
territorial	  model	  was	  well	  defended.	  	  
In	  the	  other	  case-­‐studies,	  there	  were	  few	  formal-­‐legislation	  changes	  at	  all.	  	  The	  main	  difference	  
was	   that	   there	   was	   a	   lack	   of	   leadership	   and	   no	   sense	   of	   immediate	   province-­‐based	   crisis	   or	  
conditions	  necessary	  for	  promoting	  and	  sustaining	  alternative	  ideas,	   interests,	  and	  institutions.	  	  
Within	   a	   poor,	   divided,	   small	   province,	   there	  was	   little	   opportunity	   or	   incentive	   to	   deal	   with	  
issues	  that	  tended	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  “external”	  problem.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  internal	  divisions,	  
lack	  of	  resources	  and	  public	  policy	  traditions	  have	  added	  much	  to	  the	  NL	  reputation	  as	  a	  policy	  
laggard.	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